Mohan Bhagwat speaks ‘Bangla’ and Amit Shah is learning to speak the language

Three decades of Left rule in Bengal did see politics dominated by class, and not identity. But religious identities remained strong, and BJP never took its eyes off Bengal, the state where its founder, SP Mookherjee was born.

The former hardline RSS chief K.S. Sudharshan, who I first met at the residence of LK Advani on Pandara Road, spoke in fluent Bengali, a language that Mohan Bhagwal also speaks and Amit Shah is learning. It is not accidental.

I remember Advani saying that BJP needed to focus on cultural nationalism in Bengal, from Bankim Chandra to Swami Vivekananda. He probably remembered that his Rath Yatra, inspired by the serial Mahabharata, had evoked lukewarm response in Bengal.

Ahead of the 2019 elections, I visited Jadavpur University -- a Leftist bastion. A student leader had then pointed to a lake in the campus and said pointedly, “Do you see? There’s a lotus blooming in Jadavpur.” For many Leftists, it is still Mamata Banerjee and not the BJP who is the enemy. This is not the ‘party line’ or politburo strategy, but a conviction shared by a large section of Left voters and leaders in Bengal, where politics is also highly decentralised.

How successful BJP’s propaganda in the state has been was borne out a few weeks ago when I was woken up by a call from a retired bureaucrat in Kolkata. Complaining about fresh lockdowns in the city, he said, “Mamata Banerjee has eased restrictions in Muslim-dominated areas and imposed them in Hindu-dominated areas.” I was amused and pointed out that she had no reason to do such a thing. Moreover, I pointed out, in large parts of the city Hindus and Muslims lived together. I’ve heard different versions of such claims over the past few years, each reducing the complexity of the state’s politics down to a binary of Hindus versus Muslims, and Modi versus Mamata.

That is why, after cyclone Amphan, when most of the state went without power for days, it was whispered, “Did you know, Muslims areas have power? But Hindu areas don’t.”

Stitching together these anecdotal and unverifiable claims indicates that these is a growing perception that Didi’s politics is centered around “Muslim appeasement” -- that her actions are geared towards securing the 30% Muslim votes in the state.

That the polarisation is yielding political dividend for the BJP became apparent in the general election of 2019 and belied claims by Mamata and the Left governments before her that communalism and communal politics was alien to the state.

This isn’t really the case. From the Mymensingh riot of 1906-07 to the Great Calcutta Killings and NoakhaliTipperia riots in 1946, the state saw a spate of communal violence in the decades preceding independence. And in the following decades, communal feelings and distrust never went away, fuelled by the refugees flooding the state from time to time and partly by examples of Muslims doing relatively better in business and professions. So, how well is BJP’s strategy of uniting 70% of the voters who happen to be non-Muslim, working out in the state?

There is significant ire against the Trinamool Congress government in the state, but not always against Mamata Banerjee. The alleged complicity between criminals and party functionaries in mining sand to cattle smuggling, is a key concern though most people seem to agree that Didi is personally not corrupt.

BJP has been able to chip away at Mamata’s support among Hindu voters (In 2014, the BJP had only received 21% of Hindu votes, compared to TMC’s 40%, as per data from the Centre for Study of Developing Societies). The ruling Trinamool Congress claims that BJP is trying to wean away its support base among Hindus by strategically supporting the CPI(M) and the Congress.

While BJP has been citing the example of Tripura and saying that having the same party in power in the state and at the Centre would accelerate development, it is hamstrung by the absence of a leader with following across the state. BJP leaders however argue that it is actually an advantage because not projecting a face will reduce the battle to a Modi-Mamata binary.

But those who have watched politics in Bengal would know better than to underestimate Didi. She has taken countermeasures since the Lok Sabha results. She tweeted a tribute to SP Mookerjee on his birthday in 2019 and agreed to the Prime Minister’s proposal of naming an airport after him. She has also intensified her trips to different districts, meeting people and officials and expanding the ambit of her connect with people.

Factors that could queer the pitch are Didi’s management of COVID-19 and relief after cyclone besides the voting behaviour of the traditional Left and ultra-Left supporters. The chief minister has been saying pointedly that Bengal would be run by ‘Bengalis’, a reference to non-Bengali BJP leaders like Kailash Vijayvargia, who is in charge of Bengal but cannot speak Bengali. Her attempt to use Bengali sub-nationalism to counter Hindutva hadn’t helped her in 2019, and it remains to be seen how effective it turns out to be in the Assembly election next year.

BJP hopes to gain from growing support among the state’s ‘lumpen’ and ‘subaltern’ unemployed youths. The party has also invested heavily in social media and seems to enjoy a head start in controlling the narrative in the media.

(The writer is a senior journalist and commentator based in Delhi)