Indo-UK ties: Trapped in various frictions

On July 3, the Henry Jackson Society and The Democracy Forum held a seminar in London under a title of Global Britain and India: a new ‘special partnership’. As is well known, the British Empire began to crumble in 1947 with Indian Independence. A few years ago, it came close to shrinking further in a Scottish referendum on independence. Last but not the least, the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union has reduced it to an insular, inward looking power, with much curtailed influence on world affairs, notwithstanding the fact that it remains a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

The topic of the seminar was untimely and reflected wishful thinking among Brexiteers of reinventing Britain to its glory days when the sun never set on the British empire. Such dreamers fantasise the UK will reconnect with its former colonies, now the Commonwealth of sovereign states, and thereby compensate for the withdrawal from the EU single market.

But 44% of British exports are absorbed by the EU. Only 9% by Commonwealth countries. It will take at least half a century for those figures to swap, if ever.

In this vision of the leavers, India occupies prime position as far as the Commonwealth is concerned. It is by far the biggest market in the association. Exports to and investments from a rising India – there has already been one game-changing such instance with the Tata acquiring and turning around Jaguar Land Rover – could certainly have a major impact on Britain’s economic fortunes.

But India is no longer attached to the UK’s coattails. The days of importing cloth from Manchester mills are long gone. It has a choice; and is bound to exercise this by buying what is best and at a competitive price. While Britain is still a leader in science and technology – with world class seats of learning like Oxford, Cambridge and Imperial College on its soil – its goods and services are comparatively expensive, because of the strength of the pound and the high salaries commanded in the country - partly because of the cost of living. Moreover, its manufacturing has not recovered from the decimation inflicted on it by Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s when she was the British Prime Minister.

Historically, the left of centre Labour party in Britain was closer to and more sympathetic towards India. This was a legacy of the fact that it was in office when freedom was conceded to India. Today it is perceived to be leaning towards Pakistan and Khalistan.

Meanwhile, the right of centre Conservative party leader David Cameron bidding for office in the 2010 general election, dramatically incorporated a “special relationship” with India in its manifesto. The UK had never previously used this expression other than for the United States, which crucially came to the island’s aid to turn the tide in the Second World War and defeat Nazi Germany.

Indeed, the Conservative pledge received a royal seal of approval when the British monarch Elizabeth II in opening parliament cast it in stone by defining it as an “enhanced partnership”. Within weeks of becoming Prime Minister, Cameron rushed to India to cement the envisioned co-operation. The two countries announced, among other schemes, a doubling of trade from $10 billion to $20 billion by 2015. This did not happen.

A senior official of the Indian High Commission in the UK recently revealed that the hitherto steady increase has now collapsed. This is as much a failure of the Narendra Modi administration as it is of the Theresa May government, which took charge after Cameron was forced to resign following defeat in the Brexit plebiscite.

The enthusiasm Cameron continued to exude - despite former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh not quite reciprocating this and Modi’s bombast-without-follow-up foreign policy – has not been matched by May.

Besides, the relationship has got bogged down in a quagmire of immigration. Britain claims – and perhaps correctly – that tens of thousands of Indians have illegally entered or overstayed in this country and want such people to be taken back by India. In fact, an agreement in this respect was ready for renewal during Indian PM Modi’s visit to London in April, but not executed.

Modi instead, as external affairs minister, Sushma Swaraj, disclosed, raised the matter of extradition of persons wanted in India, such as liquor baron Vijay Mallya, and visas for Indian students and businessmen. Modi was wrong on all counts.

First, while there needs to be checks to ensure imposters with ulterior motives don’t slip in to India, it is unbecoming of Delhi to delay the return of Indians who have brought India to disrepute. Secondly, issuance of visas by a country is a sovereign issue; and demeaning of India to demand it. Thirdly, Mallya’s extradition is under examination by a London magistrates’ court, over which the British executive enjoys no jurisdiction. To even remotely raise this subject with a British prime minister suggests a lack of understanding of and respect for the independence of the judiciary.

In effect, Indo-British ties are currently full of friction and on a distinctly downward spiral; and therefore, not conducive to either helping Britain to globalise or fulfilling the goal of a special bilateral relationship. It is one more in a litany of foreign affairs fiascos fostered by the big-talking Modi.

In course of the seminar, speakers highlighted that Nepal and Sri Lanka, previously close to India, have gravitated to the Chinese camp.

The latest in a long line of setbacks is of a person of Indian origin – Modi’s favourite human being – having the audacity to threaten India with sanctions if it did not reduce its relations with Iran. Nikki Haley, who holds cabinet rank in the US administration, was of course acting as a messenger for her boss, Donald Trump. It emphasises how misguided Modi has been in aligning India’s vital interests with a man who was and is clearly a threat to India and the world.