Buying the Rafale fighter jets will not fix IAF’s problems

Airpower is the most capital-intensive means of war. A modern fighter jet now could cost several hundred crores of rupees and the prices India’s first seem to be rising exponentially. The 36 Rafale deal is now estimated to be $9 billion or over ₹65,000 crores or about ₹1,500 crore each. While the Dassault Rafale will undoubtedly give us a formidable leading edge, it is its trail we must worry about. Besides, why do we want to buy the Rafale? It is somewhat closer to the Su-30MKI in class but almost four times more expensive than what is arguably the most capable and versatile of the world’s 4+ Gen fighters. It is eight times more expensive than Tejas.

The first lot of MIG-21s in 1961 cost us less than ₹20 lakh each. A brand new and latest MIG-21 variant will cost about one hundred times more. A SU30MKI costs about ₹360 crore each.

Aircraft delivered ordnance is also very expensive. For instance an air launched Brahmos supersonic missile costs over ₹15 crore each. The cost of the new smart weapons can be best understood from the following extract from a US government study after the second Gulf War: “While the vast majority of the expended ordnance was unguided—92.4%—the inverse was true for cost. About 84% of the cost was accounted for by the 7.6 % of ordnance that was guided. If the 332 cruise missiles are excluded—with their extremely high unit costs—unguided ordnance still represented about 92.6 percent of the total number expended, but the percentage of cost for ordnance that was guided decreases to 75.9%.”

The cost intensiveness of modern fighter aircraft requires they stay in service for decades and also be capable of maintaining air superiority and lethality in an environment where technological advancements are rapid. This means that the aircraft we buy today must be capable of taking two or more upgrades. Thus, the later the design and development the greater are the upgrade options. Take, for example, the MIG-21, still the mainstay of the IAF.

The latest upgraded MIG-21 has all the latest avionics and the powerful Tumansky R-25 300 engine that enables it to attain a better than 1:1 thrust-to-weight ratio for a dogfight and out climb the American frontline fighter, the F-16.

The next major consideration is cost. There are ways to compute these, but there are pitfalls when you compare apples and oranges. In fact a sound equation correlating costs, age, lethality, performance, state of art, replacement and maintenance costs, political risk and other factors is well nigh impossible. But you must start with basic unit cost.

Since modern fighter aircrafts are not only extremely expensive but also technologically very advanced machinery constructed out of the latest materials and electronics, it goes without saying that full indigenisation will never be possible. A good percentage of the parts will always be imported, either from the original aircraft manufacturer or from original equipment manufacturers (OEM) in other countries. In times of conflict the wear and tear is greater and munitions stores run down very rapidly. The new generation missiles and bombs, most of which at all times will be imported, also do not have very long shelf lives. This means that supply lines must be always open.

A multirole combat aircraft is an aircraft that can be used as both a fighter and a ground attack aircraft. A multirole fighter is differentiated from a strike fighter in that the multirole fighter was designed to equally perform both aerial combat and ground attack, while the strike fighter is typically a fighter aircraft that can also employ air-to-ground munitions.

The MRCAs are essentially supposed to be replacements for the older MIG-21, 23 and 27 series, and the indigenous Tejas LCA whose service entry service is now about fifteen years overdue. Of these the MIG-27 was a dedicated strike aircraft and the IAF still operates as many as 80 of them. The IAF also has 245 MIG-21bis fighters. We are talking about several hundred fighters. How does buying 36 Rafales be a solution? Clearly, the IAF needs a permanent solution, not another high cost fix like the Rafale.

The Tejas program commenced in 1983 and it is yet to enter full production. The reasons for this are many, but the IAF cannot shirk responsibility either as it has a track record of constantly delaying decisions and shifting goal posts. The IAF needs to be persuaded to shed its reluctance and urgently induct the Tejas light combat aircraft and push for newer and more powerful versions.

At about ₹200 crore each and but with a substantial local value addition component, the Tejas offers a huge cost-benefit advantage over Dassault Rafale multi-role fighter aircraft, as well as a huge economic multiplier. A few hundred Tejas jets of varying configurations can not only handle what the enemy can throw at us, but also contribute hugely to the national economy. After all, isn’t this is the underlying notion behind “Make in India?”