Is the Centre chalking out anti-Naxal strategy blindfolded?

A “retaliation in equal measure” to root out left-wing extremism was Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh’s political retort after the Sukma Naxal attack where 25 CRPF jawans were brutally killed. But, is that the best strategy? Many CRPF jawans have been posting videos pointing out at serious chinks in the existing strategies when it comes to execution.

Sujoy Mandal, an ex-CoBRA (Commando Battalions for Resolute Action), tells National Herald that many strategic operational flaws of the CRPF aren’t being addressed. Mandal says he was one among the many who got injured in an April 2014 Maoist attack that left three of his colleagues dead.

Mandal lists out following issues encountering the paramilitary force:

• CRPF doesn’t have its own intelligence gathering mechanism and relies on police inputs for anti-insurgency operations. And, CRPF hardly gets support from the local police during anti-Naxal operations.
• CRPF doesn’t have its own helicopters to lift the injured jawans from the encounter sites. Due to delay, many a times injured jawans succumb to injuries.
• CRPF has only two schools in Madhya Pradesh and Assam for training jawans in counter-insurgency and anti-terrorism operations. The schools impart a two-month training to at least 1,000 jawans on yearly basis.
• CRPF jawans who are inducted in anti-Naxal operations on the basis of 3-month-long guerrilla training don’t even know how to handle a weapon or salute properly.
• During anti-insurgency operations, CRPF officers rarely lead from the front. Jawans lacking proper training are pushed into counter-insurgency operations.
• During ‘area domination exercise’ a company of 70-100 jawans is usually led by an inspector rank officer. The company has to survive on Maggi noodles and biscuits for 7-10 days. After two days, jawans start feeling exhausted and stop being alert all the time.
• Jawans stand demoralised because their salaries are at par with those of peons working with the government departments. Since 2004, the Home Ministry has stopped giving pensionary benefits to CRPF jawans.

Coming back to his 2014 encounter, Mandal says some of the CRPF jawans reported suspicious movement and suggested that they should break into two columns instead of one, as prescribed by the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) in such cases. But, the suggestion was ignored and the company soon came under Maoist attack.

Mandal alleges that the Deputy Commandant and the Assistant Commandant—who hid themselves during the attack—were the ones who were recommended for President’s Police Medal for gallantry. He also claims that when he took up the various issues with the higher-ups, he was “victimised” for doing so.

More than 100 jawans—apparently inadequately trained in jungle warfare—were killed in the last seven years near Chintagufa area of Sukma district “within a radius of five kilometres”, claims Mandal.

“Neither the local politicians nor the senior officers in the force want Naxalism to end. All of them are beneficiaries of the ongoing conflict,” alleges Mandal. In February 2016, he was dismissed by the CRPF.

Be that as it may, the larger point is that the government strategists should first perhaps introspect and also look into the issues raised by the various jawans and, then, chalk out the anti-Naxal plans accordingly.