India’s predicament over Kulbhushan Jadhav

Needless to mention, the sudden and surreptitious death sentence passed on the former Indian naval officer, Kulbhushan Jadhav, without a semblance of acceptable procedure is an abomination. It reinforces the fact that the Pakistani Army languishes in total disregard of democracy and the rule of law. Sartaj Aziz, Pakistan’s de facto foreign minister, had actually told a committee of the Pakistani Senate in December that the evidence on Jadhav was “insufficient”.

That said, why has the Pak Army so brazenly raised the stakes with India? Also, is anyone in India responsible for exposing Jadhav to hopeless danger? But first, some historical background.

At the time of transfer of power, the Indian National Congress was against a free Balochistan. Pakistani professor, Sabir Badal Khan of Naples University, has recorded: “(Jawaharlal) Nehru, (Maulana) Azad and several other top leaders of the Congress openly opposed the Baloch independence.”

The Indian Independence Act, passed in the British Parliament in 1947, quite murkily legislated that rulers of princely states had the right to decide whether they wished to be a part of India, Pakistan or neither.

Nehru, as Prime Minister, entrusted his Home Minister, Vallabh Bhai Patel, to ensure the absorption of all princely states whose territories were contiguous to India. Patel carried out his assignment with aplomb. His task would in Nehru’s view have been jeopardised had the Congress made an exception by supporting an independent Balochistan ruled by the Khan of Kalat.

Balochistan’s treaty with Britain

The Khans certainly had a case on the basis of history and treaties signed by them directly with London. But this was countermanded by the Government of India Act of 1935, which held Kalat to be an Indian princely state. Britain also reneged on its recognition of Kalat as “an independent sovereign state in treaty relations with the British government and a status different from that of Indian states” as late as August 1947.

British intelligence reported Abdus Samad Khan of the pro-Congress party in Balochistan, Ajuman-i-Watan, visited India in late 1947. In March 1948, All India Radio broadcast that the Khan of Kalat had approached the Indian government to offer its accession. Nehru reacted by stating it was “an error in reporting”. In the end, after seven months of freedom, Balochistan merged – under duress – with Pakistan in March 1948.

Perhaps, in an attempt to divert international attention from his abysmal failure in Kashmir, Narendra Modi, in his last Independence Day speech, extended moral support to Baloch separatists. Senior civil servants cautioned him not to do so. But he characteristically ignored such advice.

Balochistan is not East Pakistan. There is no refugee or any other crisis affecting India because of the human rights issues festering in the region. The area in any case does not have a border with India.

Admittedly, the province is presently in the throes of a fifth uprising by secessionists since 1948. Modi added fuel to the fire with his intervention. His jab lent Islamabad ammunition to accuse India of meddling – hitherto unfounded.

Undoubtedly, historical evidence suggests the Balochi demand for homeland is justified. But there are unlikely to be takers in too many capitals for overturning an accession treaty, however contentious this may be.

Besides, an independent Balochistan is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Therefore, a disproportionate deployment of resources by India to encourage fissiparous tendencies would be long drawn out and, arguably, not of any benefit even in the medium term.

At the same time, the Pakistani Army’s audacity in dealing out a death sentence to Jadhav is intriguing. It is battling militants in various parts of its country and have a heavy stationing of troops on its border with Afghanistan. Indeed, Raheel Sharif, the last Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, declared his policy was to keep Pakistan’s eastern border quiet so as to concentrate on internal challenges and on the western front.

So, what prompted it to up the ante? 1947-48, 1965, particularly 1971, and Kargil have been a catalogue of calamities for the Pakistani armed forces. Consequently, it needs to artfully demonstrate its indispensability to its people with pinpricks, proxy wars and nuclear blackmail against India.

With the rise in Indo-Pak tension, third parties, including the United Nations and the United States, will inevitably lean heavily on the two nations to resume dialogue. Donald Trump has already indicated an unwelcome interest in mediating between the adversaries! Since Modi has insisted on only discussing Pakistan’s export of terrorism – indeed a cessation of it as a pre-condition for other exchanges – the capitulation will squarely be his, if Pakistan achieves its objective of talks on Kashmir.

Bargaining for a spy swap?

The espionage community is pessimistic about Jadhav’s fate. But unconfirmed reports from Pakistan suggest its army’s targeting of Jadhav could be a strategy to trigger a spy swap. There is, of course, a 60-day window of appeal and, thus, an opportunity for give-and-take.

After assuming office, Modi embarked on what was boastfully proclaimed to be an aggressive policy on Pakistan. This included a much advertised reversal of former Prime Minister Inder Gujral’s doctrine of downsizing intelligence gathering assets in the neighbouring country.

So, the question arises: Is Jadhav a casualty of the Modi dogma? R&AW does not hang out its operatives to dry. However, even if he was not an Indian spy, what was he doing near Balochistan holding a false Indian passport? Did someone in the government send him there? If so, will that person own responsibility if Jadhav is hanged?

Intake of sensitive information is related to investment. Agents can be re-commissioned the moment cash flow resumes. Therefore, the Gujral doctrine can be laid to rest without a high-risk, low return move.

From the youth revolt in Kashmir to taking him for a ride on Pathankot and now the provocation with Jadhav, the Pakistani establishment has tied Modi into knots. No Indian politician has been so outwitted by Pakistan. His unscheduled stopover in Lahore in 2015 looked ill-advised then; it looks contemptible now.

As ye sow, so shall ye reap. Tragically, India is passing through a period of a battering ram as initiator and a cop as implementer of critical external policy. Both out of their depths. This has naturally translated to shambles amplifying into an electric shock.

London-based Ashis Ray, former head of CNN in India, is the longest serving Indian foreign correspondent

This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own.