Trump sanctions Iran and alienates allies 

On the sixty-fifth anniversary of a regime change effected by the US in Iran, the state department announced in mid-August the setting up of an ‘Iran Action Group’ which would be responsible for “directing, reviewing and coordinating” all aspects of the department’s Iran-related activity.

The head of the group, Brian Hook, said that the announcement on the anniversary of the CIA-led coup that removed the democratic government of Mohammed Mosaddegh in August 1953 was “pure coincidence”. Few have accepted this bland explanation. Hook himself has said that the group’s activities will focus on the “twelve demands” on Iran that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had set out in May, soon after President Donald Trump had announced US withdrawal from the P5+1 nuclear agreement with Iran.

These demands are wide-ranging and include: give details of all previous nuclear weapons research, end all uranium enrichment and missiles testing, withdraw forces from all foreign countries, end support to “terrorist” groups, and release all foreign nationals jailed on spurious charges. Pompeo had added that, failing compliance, the US would impose on Iran “unprecedented financial pressure in the form of the strongest sanctions in history”.

On 6 August, Trump announced the first set of sanctions: there are to be no dollar transactions with Iran, nor can there be imports of Iranian coal, iron, steel, graphite or software used in industrial processes or imports of motor vehicles made in Iran, the country’s largest export item after oil. These sanctions will be followed by more onerous restrictions from 5 November which will target Iran’s oil exports and financial and banking transactions.

These sanctions do not just apply to US companies; they include “secondary sanctions” that restrict companies from all other countries from doing business with Iran for then they will be prevented from doing business with the US. The US has not imposed secondary sanctions either on North Korea or Cuba, both of which have been subject to long-standing and severe US sanctions.

Trump’s reasons for withdrawal from the nuclear agreement have led to considerable speculation. Trump has frequently described the agreement as “bad” and “rotten” and has boasted that he will negotiate a better deal than what Obama had achieved. Trump seems to believe that the effect of the sanctions will be to create such misery for the Iranian people that the government will be compelled to return to the negotiating table and provide Trump with a “bigger, better” deal.

The severity of the sanctions is aimed at speeding up the process. Hardly any US or foreign commentators (other than those from the hard right and the pro-Israel lobbies) believe that Trump’s game-plan has any basis in reality. Many of Trump’s complaints about the agreement, i.e., those relating to Iran’s missile programme, its role in the region and its support for “terrorist” groups, are not part of the nuclear agreement. If Trump had wished to discuss these concerns with Iran, unilaterally withdrawing from an agreement that it is fully complying with is hardly likely to make it more accommodative on these issues. There is now no evidence that Iran is willing to oblige the US president. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has described talks with the US as “useless”.

President Hassan Rouhani has expressed readiness for dialogue but has demanded that the US end its withdrawal from the nuclear agreement and end sanctions; he has also asked for US compensation for US “interventions” in Iran “from 1953 until now”. The heightened US confrontation of Iran is taking place at a time when the president has disparaged his European Union (EU) and NATO allies and has alienated most of them and China through a trade war; the US has also imposed stringent sanctions on Russia.

Thus, in this confrontation the US is largely isolated. The sanctions will certainly worsen economic conditions in Iran. According to official sources, 33 per cent of Iran’s population lives below the poverty line. Living conditions have become more onerous with the decline in the value of the national currency, the rial: each 10 per cent increase in the value of foreign currencies boosts inflation by 2 per cent; given that the dollar has appreciated 200 per cent in the last four months, inflation is estimated at 40 per cent in this period.

Due to these conditions, there have been widespread and angry demonstrations in many parts of Iran since December last year. However, this dissatisfaction is not likely to push the government into negotiations or topple it. Suzanne Maloney of Brookings has written that Iran has responded to the sanctions with “cautious resolve”; given its experience of sanctions over 35 years, its crisis management capabilities are intact and it has been able to control short-term panic.

While Trump has no interest in dragging the US into another war in West Asia, his ultimate intention is to promote regime change in Iran, mainly by encouraging disaffection among its ethnic and doctrinal minorities. But, given the resilience of the regime, the strength of the security forces, the absence of a viable alternative, and the pervasive dislike of the US, this is as likely to be as unsuccessful as the pressure on Iran to negotiate.

In fact, this could strengthen the hardliners and make Iran even more intractable in its dealings with the US and its role in the region. For now, Iran may be expected adhere to the nuclear agreement and watch the extent to which the EU, China and Russia are able to thwart the full impact of the US sanctions.

It will also closely follow the fortunes of the US president, whose standing and credibility are being battered at home due to repeated exposures of misdemeanours and personal misconduct. Convinced that the US will not resort to military force, Iran is banking on Trump being a one-term president; it just needs to be patient and resilient for another three years or so before this disruptive force is eliminated from world affairs.

The author is a former diplomat