Has India played into China’s hands?

As the Narendra Modi government credits itself for its breakthrough agreement with Beijing that has led to troop disengagement by both sides along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh, a closer look reveals that unwittingly, or otherwise, New Delhi has played into Chinese hands, if not negotiated a complete sell-out.

On the backfoot since April 2020 when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) swept across the LAC into eastern Ladakh, the Indian government is now vastly relieved by the completion of troop disengagement by both sides on 30 October 2024 in the last two remaining friction points of Depsang Plains and Demchok village.

However, both these militarily strategic spots are well within what India considers is its territory, Demchok located some 600 m from the LAC, while Depsang is part of the 37,244 sq. km high-altitude desert of Aksai Chin that China had appropriated in its only war with India, in 1962, but which India claims is part of Ladakh.

Indian Army sources mentioned that both sides would soon start coordinated patrolling in their respective areas as part of the land-mark bilateral agreement arrived at on 21 October.

They left unsaid that the “respective areas” are Indian territory, so essentially New Delhi is implicitly accepting foreign armed presence on Indian soil and is simultaneously satisfied that the Chinese side is granting Indian soldiers access to their own areas.

China, in turn, has always considered vast stretches of the 3,488-km LAC, which stretches along five Indian states, from Jammu and Kashmir in the north-west to Arunachal Pradesh in the north-east, as disputed.

Indeed, it has historically claimed the entire 83,743 sq. km Arunachal Pradesh, which it calls Zangnan, or South Tibet. China extended itself to India’s frontiers ever since it annexed Tibet in 1950.

India’s home ministry too has acknowledged that “the border is not fully demarcated and the process of clarifying and confirming the LAC is in progress”. It adds that the area is characterised by high altitude terrain and thick habitation that has resulted in inadequate development of infrastructure in these regions.

Indian Army sources pointed out that ground commanders — brigadiers and below — have been meeting to work out the modalities of patrolling. “The coordinated patrolling from the two sides, with prior intimation to each other to avoid face-offs, will then begin after mutual verification,” they added. “Talks are also underway on other issues like the ‘buffer zones’ created earlier in the high-altitude region.”

There is, however, no mention that the agreement with Beijing concerns Chinese presence on what New Delhi considers its inalienable territory. The Indian authorities are drawing comfort from the agreement that the PLA “will not block Indian troops” from the ‘bottleneck area’ 18 km inside Indian territory and they can now patrol up to their traditional patrolling points (PPs) 10, 11, 11A, 12 and 13 at the strategically located Depsang Plains.

They are encouraged by the agreement enabling the Indian Army to gain access to two crucial PPs in the Charding Ninglung Nallah track junction near Demchok. Indian shepherds will also not be obstructed from taking their animals to the traditional grazing grounds there. The PLA had hitherto resisted restoring patrolling rights to the Indian side in Depsang and Demchok.

The present agreement, however, does not include no-patrol buffer zones set up in the earlier rounds of disengagement till September 2022. Besides, India’s efforts towards de-escalation by the PLA along the entire LAC and de-induction of the over 100,000 troops forward-deployed by each side are still ongoing.

Though the new agreement and the bilateral summit have been important steps in defusing tensions between the two countries and in finally bringing the two leaders face-to-face since the 2020 PLA incursion, New Delhi should tread with caution as Beijing has proved to be an inscrutable and unpredictable neighbour.

A day after the latest India–China agreement, Indian Army chief General Upendra Dwivedi pointed to ‘trust’ issues with China saying, “We want to go back to the status quo of April 2020; thereafter we will be looking at disengagement, de-escalation and normal management of LAC... this has been our stand since April 2020.”

Dwivedi added: “As of now, we are trying to restore the trust. That will happen once we are able to… reassure each other that we are not creeping into buffer zones that have been created.” He and other observers do not find anything confirming China’s willingness on the ground, which will only be clear after the troops move back and permanent structures are removed.

His predecessor, General Manoj Pande, had in January 2023 spoken of China’s increased troop deployments in eastern Ladakh. The PLA had reportedly crossed the LAC in July 2021 to reoccupy certain positions that they had vacated following a demilitarisation agreement five months earlier, and others had moved to points near the Galwan river and Pangong Tso.

Any misgivings on the present demilitarisation agreement are hence not misplaced. After all, the Chinese have created a more formidable presence in eastern Ladakh than mere patrolling. Satellite imagery obtained from the US’s Maxar Technologies and analysed by international geo-intelligence experts has revealed construction by Chinese forces of reinforced tunnels and shelters into a hillside along a gorge in the contested Aksai Chin region.

Surveillance and satellite imagery have also indicated China’s three-layer projection of force along the LAC, with a border regiment forming the first layer, two divisions of Xinjiang and Tibet Military district troops the second, and reserve troops in the form of four light to medium combined armed brigades, or CABs, forming the third. Each CAB has around 4,500 troops, with mechanised elements and armour as per terrain requirement.

Though Modi and Xi have met 18 times between 2014 and 2019, the prime minister surprisingly failed to take up the eastern Ladakh issue even telephonically with the Chinese president. Indeed, Modi not only avoided identifying China as the aggressor while insisting that “no intruder is present inside India’s borders, nor is any post under anyone’s custody”, he had also urged Washington not to bring up China’s border transgressions, according to former US ambassador Kenneth Juster when asked by an Indian TV channel in 2022 why the United States had not made any statement about Beijing’s aggression.

His reticence in identifying Beijing as the aggressor had, in fact, emboldened it to question the need for military negotiations on any such transgression.

China moreover launched a series of unprovoked cross-border intrusions, opening up additional fronts at India’s other border states of Uttarakhand in the north and Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim in the north-east, even as it amassed additional troops across the border, armed with artillery, air defences, combat drones and heavy vehicles.

Debunking the 2023 edition of China’s ‘standard map’ that claims ownership of both Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin, India’s external affairs minister S. Jaishankar huffed: “China has put out maps with territories [that are] not theirs. [It is an] old habit. Just by putting out maps with parts of India... doesn’t change anything. Our government is very clear about our territory. Making absurd claims does not make other people’s territories yours.”

Significantly, Xi had never broached the LAC intrusion subject at any stage, lending grist to the belief that China’s military offensives against India have not been merely tactical, but have a strategic intent aimed at realising specific long-term objectives. The PLA’s moves have, after all, been directed by China’s seniormost leadership, namely, the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which Xi chairs.

India has portrayed its 21 October agreement as a major triumph in negotiations with China, while never acknowledging the failure of military intelligence if indeed the Indian side was caught unawares while China was brazenly breaching the LAC with its foot soldiers.