Ladakh and Galwan Valley: Status quo ante, or a new status quo?

The announcement ahead of the BRICS summit in Russia — with a possible meeting between PM Modi and President Xi Jinping of China on the sidelines — that the two countries have resolved their border disputes is being hailed by the Indian media as a huge step forward. Sceptics, however, want more details, in order to assess whether this is just headline management.

During the last four years, since Indian and Chinese troops clashed in an ‘unarmed’ combat that left 20 Indian soldiers and several Chinese soldiers dead on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh, bilateral relations have been frosty.

There have been no direct flights between the two countries, no exchange of journalists or even students.

While India continued to import essential raw materials, equipment etc. from China, it banned several Chinese apps and made it difficult for Chinese companies to operate or invest in India.

What is more, as commentators noted, in bilateral and multi-lateral meetings, Prime Minister Modi and President Xi could barely look at each other, much less talk and exchange greetings.

Therefore, the announcement by Indian foreign secretary Vikek Misri on Sunday, 20 October — a day before the two leaders were scheduled to meet in Russia at the BRICS summit — that India and China had resolved differences and reached an agreement on patrolling in eastern Ladakh took the diplomatic world by surprise.

The announcement was hailed with cautious optimism but also scepticism.

The conspicuous absence of a joint statement is what raised suspicion. A major diplomatic breakthrough, it was pointed out, would invariably have been accompanied by a joint communique.

The complete silence from the Chinese side made it look like another attempt at optics to enable PM Modi and President Xi to meet in a more positive and cordial environment at the BRICS summit.

Now, all eyes will be on the two leaders and whether they do end up having a bilateral meeting at a multilateral summit. Their body language and the warmth with which they shake hands would be keenly watched to read what is in the mind of the two leaders.

On Monday, 21 October, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson was reported to have confirmed that talks have progressed. The Global Times, a Chinese Communist Party-run tabloid, reported ministry spokesperson Lin Jian saying that India and China had “reached a solution on relevant matters.” China is going to work with India to implement the solution plan, Lin said.

“China and India have maintained close communication through diplomatic and military channels regarding border-related issues. Currently, the two sides have reached a solution on the relevant matters, which China views positively,” Lin was quoted as saying.

Union external affairs minister S. Jaishankar stated at the NDTV-sponsored The World summit that “the disengagement process has been completed” for the four-year-long military stand-off. Patrolling would resume as was being done till 2020, Jaishankar said.

However, what does that mean on the ground for Indian troops, asked several defence and strategic affairs experts. Will the troops go back to their position before the 2020 clash and resume patrolling to the areas they did before? Or will the patrolling resume on new boundaries?

In their initial reactions, strategic experts and diplomats had widely varying stances.

Now, after every round of diplomatic or military talks, India and China have released fairly similar statements. So, when India unilaterally announced a new patrolling arrangement yesterday without releasing any details, something seemed amiss.

The Indian foreign minister made a vaguely worded claim that "we have gone back to where the situation was in 2020". April 2020 was when China changed the territorial status quo in India's Ladakh by encroaching on key borderlands. Subsequently, it has created new military posts on the ground along the entire Himalayan frontier by building permanent warfare-related infrastructure, including a wide array of underground facilities. Make no mistake: A return to status quo ante is not going to happen.

Basically, as I understand it, disengagement is taking place in the two last areas along the LAC where problems had persisted, that is Demchok and Depsang. This is just a first step but it is a significant development and should assist in a reduction of tensions. De-escalation would have to be the next step.

Measures to ensure peace and tranquillity in the areas along the LAC can be augmented on the basis of the precedents that existed in the years before Galwan (the various agreements that existed in those years to ensure peace and CBMs should provide a useful playbook). It was never in either country’s interest that tensions should have persisted in situations of such close confrontation, for so long.

This latest development is a positive augury for the future, although there is much painstaking work that lies ahead for both sides to ensure a peaceful LAC.

The details about the resolution of the border issues with China are sketchy, however. The obvious question is about the lack of an equivalent/ joint statement from Beijing. The foreign secretary only used two phrases: "patrolling arrangements" and "disengagement", which don't equal a return to the status quo ante.

Lack of detail in an announcement meant to grab headlines can often signal a situation where a lot is obscured. Those who remember the 2017 Doklam 'disengagement' would know what that means. The PLA gained permanent presence there in that process.

Of course, this current announcement is meant to pave way for a meeting between Xi and Modi at Kazan without any pressure of having an unresolved border issue. It will also take scrutiny off the Modi government for maintaining deep economic and trade ties (investment and technology) with China, in the circumstances.

Will there be repercussions of this border issue resolution in Washington DC? This remains to be seen, but those who thought India was intractably opposed to China would be surprised that their differences are only over a border dispute.

Three things are clear:

1. Modi has gone to the BRICS summit with focus to further strengthen the India–Russia strategic partnership.

2. Putin is holding a trilateral summit with Modi and Xi on 23 October — on the sidelines of the BRICS summit. This will be significant, since twice before, Putin has helped ease India–China relations — first, at the Sochi summit with Modi within a week of the 2018 Wuhan summit between Modi and Xi; second, by getting India and China to sign the 10 September 2020 joint statement in Moscow for peace along the LAC.

3. A trilateral meeting of Putin, Modi and Xi is better than a Modi–Xi bilateral tryst, since mutual trust is absent in the latter.

A distinctive feature of the Modi government is that it is rarely truthful. The LAC proposal was made by the Chinese side at the WMCC meet on 29 August in Beijing. India responded positively to it at the time. But now, showcasing the idea as a breakthrough of the Modi government a day before Modi leaves for the BRICS summit is, one might suggest, opportunistic, if not outright specious.

However, here's hoping for improvement in India–China relations, which might help ease India–Pakistan ties as well!