What has India gained by playing Washington’s game in Asia?

Read part I of this article ‘Eye on External Affairs: How Modi mishandled India’s China policy’ here.

Chinese intransigence towards India has increased because it interprets Narendra Modi’s Joint Strategic Vision for Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region agreed with the United States as being a counter to China. (This has also, worryingly, resulted in Russia—historically important for India—cosying up to China and making initial moves to improve relations with Pakistan.)

It has been fashionable to espouse since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and therefore the end of the Cold War, that Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s concept of non-alignment is outdated. That, though, does not mean India’s practice of maintaining an equal distance from super power rivalries has become invalid, especially amid rising tensions between the US and a Vladimir Putin-led Russia and potentially between a Donald Trump-stewarded US and China.

It is worse, indeed a dangerous deviation, if India is seen to be an agent of Washington in Asia. It compromises India’s independence and self-respect in the realm of foreign policy. 1962 was different, when Nehru sought and was extended assistance by President John Kennedy because of the Chinese incursion into Arunachal Pradesh. There is no justification in contemporary circumstances to provoke a difficult neighbour with which India would do well to normalise relations. Modi’s clinch of Washington directed against China will not only escalate friction, but further cement the China-Pakistan axis against India.

Normally, the President of India tours countries the prime minister has not visited or cannot visit, unless expediency demands otherwise. The fact that Pranab Mukherjee went to China within a year of Modi going there and only months before another trip by the latter, indicates intense high-level diplomacy is required to reduce the Chinese animosity.

By playing America’s game in Asia, what has India gained in return? Admittedly, it has obtained access to cutting edge military hardware. But the fact that such acquisition has come at a cost of $15 billion since 2007—a significant portion of which has been earmarked by Modi—means it is really the US defence industry that's laughing all the way to the bank. Besides, the US has spurned India's participation in multi-lateral talks on Afghanistan, while accommodating Pakistan and China.

When Manmohan Singh was in charge, President George W Bush twisted China’s arm to ensure a waiver for India from the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Either President Barack Obama was not endowed with the same clout or unwilling to pick up the phone to Xi Jinping when it came to India's membership of the NSG. In any case, the latter pursuit is an obsession of Modi—an inferiority complex to match Singh's achievement—which has so far only extracted a series of avoidable rebuffs for India.

As the distinguished former Indian diplomat, Satyabrata Pal, bluntly put it: “The government’s obsessive quest for membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group is very like the hunting of the Snark, a macabre, tragicomic pursuit which ends with the hunter becoming the quarry.” The waiver is unique and gives India the necessary access in the nuclear field; whereas membership as long as India is not recognised as a nuclear state under the non-proliferation treaty would be in a second class category.

Furthermore, has 33 months of bonhomie between Modi and the US administration compelled the latter to lean on Pakistan on anything critical to India? As a matter of fact, Washington’s most helpful statements—whether from its president or secretary of state—in respect of India’s western neighbour emanated when Singh was in office.

In a survey last year, the International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded India now had only two reliable neighbours—Bangladesh and Bhutan—among the seven altogether. This is probably the worst scenario India has ever plunged into.

Among the few special relationships India has enjoyed since independence is the bond with Nepal. The India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950 cast in stone brotherly ties, free movement of people, goods and services and exceptional mutual economic advantages. By virtue of such understanding, Kathmandu—to India’s strategic satisfaction—kept China at bay.

Last week, much to the Ministry of External Affairs’ consternation, Nepal and China held a joint military exercise. Ostensibly, this was to train Nepali security forces in counter terrorism. The event does not violate the 1950 pact, but Nepal has been exchanging expertise with India in the same sphere for a decade! So, what was the need to additionally do it with China?

With Modi aggravating China by teaming up with the US, Australia and Japan to contain it, Beijing has stepped up its ambitions to consolidate ties with India’s neighbours. In addition to its all-weather ally Pakistan, its trade and investment links with Myanmar locks it in, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are being slowly seduced and now leftist Nepal is becoming the latest target in China’s attempt to encircle India.

It is no secret that the Bharatiya Janata Party has always urged Nepal to become a Hindu Rashtra, much to the country’s communist and secular parties’ irritation.

In 2015, Nepal accused India of interfering with the drafting of its new constitution and instigating an economic blockade of the land-locked country. The net result of the confrontation was Kathmandu looking at China as an alternative trading route and indeed seeking to import petrol from it.

Thereafter, last year, Nepal proceeded to secure transit rights through China. In addition to road and rail connectivity with Tibet, Chinese companies are set to build ambitious additional railway links between the two countries, not to mention infrastructure within Nepal.

It is of course true, China has a long way to go to make an impact on India’s predominance over Nepal’s economy and exit and entry routes. But its enlarging footprint in and influence over India’s previously solid ally cannot be anything but worrying for New Delhi. And Modi’s patronising approach cannot be absolved of responsibility for the misunderstanding.

London-based Ashish Ray, former head of CNN in India, is the longest serving Indian foreign correspondent