Rajiv’s manoeuvring gave India an upperhand in Afghan politics

It was apparent to me that Natwar (Singh) played a significant role towards the climax of Rajiv’s Afghan gamble. He was used as a megaphone to broadcast Rajiv’s views to the United States via the parliament of India, and so his statements refl ected the views of the prime minister. Rajiv Gandhi’s instruction to Natwar to meet Zahir Shah in Rome had a much broader diplomatic impact than was probably evident at that moment to any of the Indian stakeholders, including Natwar. Rajiv Gandhi wanted the US-laid chessboard to be replaced by the India-owned chess pieces. In Rajiv Gandhi’s game, Zahir Shah had to shed his previous warmth for the US and embrace India.

As told to Peter Galbraith by Rajiv Gandhi, Natwar Singh flew to Rome for a meeting with Zahir Shah, which was organized by General Abdul Wali, the exiled king’s son-in-law who also acted as the interpreter for the French-speaking Afghan king. The king told Natwar Singh that he was glad to find that Indians had arrived at his doorstep. He recollected that he had met Rajiv Gandhi in 1968 when he visited Kabul with his wife Sonia as part of his mother’s entourage. He made some observations that were right and some that were off the mark but the bottom line was that the Shah was once more ready to serve as the leader of a government if all sides agreed. But he was disappointed by the fact that not all were enthusiastic about his prospective return, especially the mujahideen in Peshawar, Iran and some groups of fi ghters in Afghanistan who had built their own power bases and did not wish to part with their influence.

Natwar Singh was moved on meeting the exiled king but felt that Zahir Shah was a pawn in the hands of his relatives, especially his younger male relatives, who saw in their country’s instability another chance to return to their previous position of infl uence. ‘We wanted Zahir Shah to come back to Kabul. We would guarantee safety and security for him and his supporters and he would then preside over a Loya Jirga of all the tribes of Afghanistan. But he was just not ready,’ Natwar said, recollecting the reason that prompted him to travel to Rome.

Zahir Shah was not a man who could handle a volatile country torn by confl icts. Afghanistan needed a man capable of taking tough decisions and the Indians had already met him. That man was Najibullah.

The meeting between Natwar Singh and Zahir Shah came as a bolt from the blue for the Americans and the Pakistanis as the impact of this meeting ricocheted from Rome to Washington DC and Islamabad, and fi nally landed in Delhi. But the biggest setback due to this meeting was felt in Peshawar where the resistance fighters were planning a meeting with Zahir Shah in their bid to forge a greater understanding with the exiled monarch.

It was during this visit that the Zahir Shah formula became clear. In the dictionary of the State Department, the Afghan resistance groups against the Soviets were divided between the ‘traditionalists’ and the ‘Islamists’. The traditionalists included the leader of the National Islamic Front, Sayed Ahmad Gailani, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi and Nabi Mohammedi, leader of Harkat-i-Inquilabi-Islami. The Islamists on the other hand included Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Yunis Khalis of Hezb-e-Islami, and Burhanuddin Rabbani of Jamiat-e-Islami.

The traditionalists, Mojaddedi, Gailani and Mohammedi, were known for their Sufi Islamic affi liation and support for the deposed monarchy of Afghanistan. The Islamists/fundamentalists on the other hand supported an austere and hard-line Islam, and opposed bringing back the monarchy.

Shah was not a man who could deliver. The meeting also destroyed Zahir Shah’s chances of being picked up by the Pakistanis and the Americans as General Zia was being advised about the unsuitability of Zahir Shah after his meeting with Natwar Singh.

For a last-ditch attempt at an international effort to have a broad-based government in Kabul, Vorontsov (Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Ivor Vorontsov) arrived in Delhi on 8 February for a round of consultations with Rajiv Gandhi.

Vorontsov’s visit to Delhi was in preparation for a wider discussion that was taking place involving the regional stakeholders. As the news of the Natwar–Zahir meeting reached Islamabad and Peshawar, the UN-appointed peacemaker Diego Cordovez returned to Pakistan for preparing for the talks in Geneva, which, as Vorontsov had earlier stated, had to be the last round of talks with concrete plans for Afghanistan’s next government as well as the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

During the meeting with Cordovez, acting foreign minister Zain Noorani remarked that Zahir Shah had, by meeting Natwar Singh in his residence in Rome, ‘cooked his own goose’. Noorani thereafter informed Diego Cordovez that the Pakistanis were working towards ensuring that the mujahideen get to present him with their demands.

Hamid Gul of the ISI had already arranged a meeting between the mujahideen leaders and Cordovez on 4 February and the mujahideen–Cordovez meeting signalled that the Najibullah government would not get the upper hand as was expected. The question, therefore, was if the Najibullah government was with the Indians, the UN negotiator was dragged by Pakistan to the mujahideen, and the ‘supreme guardian’ Zahir Shah was dismissed out of the plan by Pakistan, what remained of the broad-based government? The mujahideen were the ‘broad-based government’ now, at least from the point of view of the Pakistani intelligence.

Picking up the pieces of the ruins of his diplomacy over the last four months, Rajiv Gandhi had made his move and attained two goals, contrary to each other.

Zahir Shah was being considered as the ‘supreme guardian' of the Afghan coalition government till the US Congress passed an anti-India resolution and effectively threw out India from the group of decision makers on post-Soviet Afghanistan. But by sending Natwar Singh to meet the exiled king in Rome, Rajiv ensured that no future ruler of Kabul could neglect Indian security interests. Rajiv ensured that if the mujahideen–Zia alliance refused to accept the India–Zahir Shah–Najibullah–mujahideen alliance as partners, he was all too happy to allow Natwar’s ‘kiss of death’ to work for Zahir Shah like it did for Najibullah. Many in Peshawar,

Washington DC and Islamabad viewed the meeting between Natwar Singh and Zahir Shah as a kiss of death from Delhi, which eliminated the king from the race to regain the lost crown.

Rajiv Gandhi had the ultimate revenge by disqualifying the man that the Americans and Pakistanis were propping up to preside over a mujahideen-heavy government, sidelining Najibullah. Rajiv had his revenge for the humiliation of December 1987 and for all practical purposes destroyed the talks that Reagan, Bush, Zia and Gorbachev had been planning since 1985 with his help.

Ronen Sen disagrees with my description of Rajiv’s actions as vengeance after the humiliation in the US Congress. He feels that whatever Rajiv did during this period was part of the overall Indian strategy.

Excerpts taken with permission from Harper Collins; Pg 300; Rs 599